Tradable permits vs. ecological dumping

Arbeitspapier

In this paper we examine an alternative policy scenario, where governments allow polluting firms to trade permits in a strategic environmental policy model. We demonstrate, among other things, that with no market power in the permits market, governments of the exporting firms do not have an incentive to under-regulate pollution in order to become more competitive. This strategic effect is reversed and leads to a welfare level closer to the cooperative one and strictly higher to that when permits are non-tradable. Allowing for market power in the permits market, the incentive to under-regulate pollution re-appears regardless of whether permits are tradable or not. With tradable permits, however, the incentive to under-regulate pollution is comparatively weaker relative to the case of non-tradable permits. This entails potential benefits for the exporting firms and countries since the prisoners' dilemma is moderated.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 2010,2

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Environmental Economics: Government Policy ; Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation ; Trade and Environment
• Thema: Strategic Environmental Policy ; Tradable Permits ; Race to the top ; Emissionshandel ; Umweltpolitik ; Dumping ; Duopol ; Außenwirtschaftstheorie ; Marktmacht ; Spieltheorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Antoniou, Fabio ; Hatzipanayotou, Panos ; Koundouri, Phoebe
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (wo): Milano
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43491
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ