Arbeitspapier

Money talks

We study credible information transmission by a benevolent Central Bank. We consider two possibilities: direct revelation through an announcement, versus indirect information transmission through monetary policy. These two ways of transmitting information have very different consequences. Since the objectives of the Central Bank and those of individual investors are not always aligned, private investors might rationally ignore announcements by the Central Bank. In contrast, information transmission through changes in the interest rate creates a distortion, thus, lending an amount of credibility. This induces the private investors to rationally take into account information revealed through monetary policy.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 1091

Classification
Wirtschaft
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Money and Interest Rates: General
Monetary Policy
Subject
Information
Interest Rates
monetary policy
Geldpolitik
Glaubwürdigkeit
Politische Kommunikation
Zentralbank
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Hoerova, Marie
Monnet, Cyril
Temzelides, Ted
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
European Central Bank (ECB)
(where)
Frankfurt a. M.
(when)
2009

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Hoerova, Marie
  • Monnet, Cyril
  • Temzelides, Ted
  • European Central Bank (ECB)

Time of origin

  • 2009

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