Arbeitspapier

Privatization and Foreign Competition

This paper determines the equilibrium market structure in a mixed international oligopoly, where the state assets are sold at an auction. The model suggests that low greenfield costs and low trade costs induce foreign acquisitions. The intuition is that domestic firms can then not prevent foreign firms from becoming strong competitors and thus, their willingness to pay for the state assets is low. We also find that profit shifting from domestic to foreign firms generated by National Treatments clauses is partly paid for by the foreign investor in the bidding competition over the state assets.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IUI Working Paper ; No. 545

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Multinational Firms; International Business
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
Thema
Privatization
Failing firms
FDI
Acquisitions
National treatment
Privatisierung
Übernahme
Auslandsinvestition
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Persson, Lars
Norbäck, Pehr-Johan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
(wo)
Stockholm
(wann)
2001

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Persson, Lars
  • Norbäck, Pehr-Johan
  • The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)

Entstanden

  • 2001

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