Arbeitspapier

Privatization when workers control firms: Mass privatization versus MEBO

In many transition economies, insiders controlled state-owned firms, de facto. For such firms, we model the decision about privatization method, focusing on the choice between free distribution (so called 'mass privatization') and management-employee buyouts. We incorporate a political feasibility constraint that the revenue-maximising government cannot pay insiders to take firms off its hands. Although mass privatization apparently conflicts with revenue maximization, we show that nonetheless it may be the preferred method, and if so it will be complementary with the state continuing to own shares. Mass privatization is more likely to be chosen if the government is politically weak.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: TIGER Working Paper Series ; No. 92

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Planning, Coordination, and Reform
Thema
Privatization methods
Transition economies
Privatisierung
Übernahme
Systemtransformation
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bennett, John
Estrin, Saul
Maw, James
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Transformation, Integration and Globalization Economic Research (TIGER)
(wo)
Warsaw
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bennett, John
  • Estrin, Saul
  • Maw, James
  • Transformation, Integration and Globalization Economic Research (TIGER)

Entstanden

  • 2006

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