Arbeitspapier

Airport privatization and international competition

We provide a simple theoretical model to explain the mechanism whereby privatization of international airports can improve welfare. The model consists of a downstream (airline) duopoly with two inputs landings at two airports) and two types of consumers. The airline companies compete internationally. Using the simple international duopoly model, we show that the outcome where both airports are privatized is always an equilibrium while that where no airport is privatized is another equilibrium only if the degree of product differentiation is large.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 792

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Transportation Economics: Government Pricing and Policy
Thema
airline
airport
privatization
international competition
vertical relations
Flughafen
Privatisierung
Internationaler Wettbewerb
Duopol
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Matsumura, Toshihiro
Matsushima, Noriaki
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
(wo)
Osaka
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Matsumura, Toshihiro
  • Matsushima, Noriaki
  • Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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