Arbeitspapier
Airport privatization and international competition
We provide a simple theoretical model to explain the mechanism whereby privatization of international airports can improve welfare. The model consists of a downstream (airline) duopoly with two inputs landings at two airports) and two types of consumers. The airline companies compete internationally. Using the simple international duopoly model, we show that the outcome where both airports are privatized is always an equilibrium while that where no airport is privatized is another equilibrium only if the degree of product differentiation is large.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 792
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Transportation Economics: Government Pricing and Policy
- Thema
-
airline
airport
privatization
international competition
vertical relations
Flughafen
Privatisierung
Internationaler Wettbewerb
Duopol
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Matsumura, Toshihiro
Matsushima, Noriaki
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Matsumura, Toshihiro
- Matsushima, Noriaki
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2010