Arbeitspapier

Static Costs vs. Dynamic Benefits of a Minimum Quality Standard under Cournot Competition

Imposing a minimum quality standard (MQS) is conventionally regarded as harmful if firms compete in quantities. This, however, ignores dynamic effects. We show that an MQS can hinder collusion, resulting in dynamic welfare gains that reduce and may even outweigh the usual static losses. Verdicts on MQS thus depend even more on the market at hand than has been acknowledged.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion paper ; No. 23

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Economics of Regulation
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Thema
minimal quality standard
Cournot competition
collusion

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Napel, Stefan
Oldehaver, Gunnar
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
(wo)
Turku
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Napel, Stefan
  • Oldehaver, Gunnar
  • Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)

Entstanden

  • 2007

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