Arbeitspapier
Static Costs vs. Dynamic Benefits of a Minimum Quality Standard under Cournot Competition
Imposing a minimum quality standard (MQS) is conventionally regarded as harmful if firms compete in quantities. This, however, ignores dynamic effects. We show that an MQS can hinder collusion, resulting in dynamic welfare gains that reduce and may even outweigh the usual static losses. Verdicts on MQS thus depend even more on the market at hand than has been acknowledged.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion paper ; No. 23
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Economics of Regulation
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- Thema
-
minimal quality standard
Cournot competition
collusion
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Napel, Stefan
Oldehaver, Gunnar
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
- (wo)
-
Turku
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Napel, Stefan
- Oldehaver, Gunnar
- Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
Entstanden
- 2007