The role of choice in social dilemma experiments

Arbeitspapier

On the basis of problems related to asymmetric information, self-governance has been proposed and often empirically found to be superior to the external imposition of rules in social dilemma situations. The present paper suggests and experimentally analyses a different line of argument, namely to what extent behavioral aspects can explain these findings. We study this hypothesis using the simplest, most general dilemma form: the prisoner’s dilemma (PD). We compare behavior when players are given the possibility of choosing between two different representations of the same PD, to behavior when players are externally assigned to play a specific game. We find that cooperation rates are significantly higher in the games that were chosen.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2003/7

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Public Goods ; Design of Experiments: General ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
• Thema: Freedom of Choice ; Self-governance ; Social Dilemmas ; Framing ; Gefangenendilemma ; Entscheidung ; Test

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Maier-Rigaud, Frank P. ; Apesteguia, Jose
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2003

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85137
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ