The Role of Choice in Social Dilemma Experiments

Arbeitspapier

On the basis of problems related to asymmetric information, self-governance has been proposed and often empirically found to be superior to the external imposition of rules in social dilemma situations. The present paper suggests and experimentally analyses a different line of argument, namely to what extent behavioral aspects can explain these findings. We study this hypothesis using the simplest, most general dilemma form: the prisoner's dilemma (PD). We compare behavior when players are given the possibility of choosing between two different representations of the same PD, to behavior when players are externally assigned to play a specific game. We find that cooperation rates are significantly higher in the games that were chosen.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 22/2003

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Public Goods ; Design of Experiments: General ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
• Subject: Freedom of Choice ; Self-governance ; Social Dilemmas ; Framing ; Gefangenendilemma ; Entscheidung ; Experiment

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Maier-Rigaud, Frank P. ; Apesteguia, José
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22882
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET