Voting with feet: community choice in social dilemmas

Arbeitspapier

Economic and social interactions often take place in open communities but the dynamics of the community choice process and its impact on cooperation of its members are yet not well understood. We experimentally investigate community choice in social dilemmas. Participants repeatedly choose between a community with and an alternative without punishment opportunities. Within each community a social dilemma game is played. While the community with punishment grows over time and fully cooperates, the alternative becomes depopulated. We analyze the success of this voting with feet mechanism and find that endogenous self-selection is key while slow growth is less decisive.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 4643

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Public Goods
• Subject: Cooperation ; social dilemmas ; community choice ; punishment ; voting with feet ; Abwanderung und Widerspruch ; Kommunalpolitik ; Gefangenendilemma ; Trittbrettfahrerverhalten ; Rechtsdurchsetzung ; Binnenwanderung ; Test ; Public Choice

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Gürerk, Özgür ; Irlenbusch, Bernd ; Rockenbach, Bettina
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36329
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET