Arbeitspapier

Voting with feet: community choice in social dilemmas

Economic and social interactions often take place in open communities but the dynamics of the community choice process and its impact on cooperation of its members are yet not well understood. We experimentally investigate community choice in social dilemmas. Participants repeatedly choose between a community with and an alternative without punishment opportunities. Within each community a social dilemma game is played. While the community with punishment grows over time and fully cooperates, the alternative becomes depopulated. We analyze the success of this voting with feet mechanism and find that endogenous self-selection is key while slow growth is less decisive.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 4643

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Public Goods
Thema
Cooperation
social dilemmas
community choice
punishment
voting with feet
Abwanderung und Widerspruch
Kommunalpolitik
Gefangenendilemma
Trittbrettfahrerverhalten
Rechtsdurchsetzung
Binnenwanderung
Test
Public Choice

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gürerk, Özgür
Irlenbusch, Bernd
Rockenbach, Bettina
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gürerk, Özgür
  • Irlenbusch, Bernd
  • Rockenbach, Bettina
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2009

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