Trust, Salience and Deterrence: Evidence from an Antitrust Experiment

Arbeitspapier

We present results from a laboratory experiment identifying the main channels through which different law enforcement strategies deter organized economic crime. The absolute level of a fine has a strong deterrence effect, even when the exogenous probability of apprehension is zero. This effect appears to be driven by distrust or fear of betrayal, as it increases significantly when the incentives to betray partners are strengthened by policies offering amnesty to “turncoat whistleblowers”. We also document a strong deterrence effect of the sum of fines paid in the past, which suggests a significant role for salience or availability heuristic in law enforcement.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 859

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General ; Antitrust Law ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
• Subject: Betrayal ; Collusion ; Corruption ; Distrust ; Fraud ; Organized Crime ; Whistleblowers ; Wirtschaftskriminalität ; Kartell ; Whistleblowing ; Kartellrecht ; Test ; Schweden

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bigoni, Maria ; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof ; Le Coq, Chloe ; Spagnolo, Giancarlo
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
• (where): Stockholm
• (when): 2011

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81361
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET