Arbeitspapier

Chicken or checkin'? Rational learning in repeated chess games

We examine rational learning among expert chess players and how they update their beliefs in repeated games with the same opponent. We present a model that explains how equilibrium play is affected when players change their choice of strategy when receiving additional information from each encounter. We employ a large international panel dataset with controls for risk preferences and playing skills whereby the latter accounts for ability. Although expert chess players are intelligent, productive and equipped with adequate data and specialized computer programs, we find large learning effects. Moreover, as predicted by the model, risk-averse players learn substantially faster.

Sprache: Englisch

Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 5862

Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

Thema: rational learning
risk aversion
beliefs

Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung

(wer): Gerdes, Christer
Gränsmark, Patrik
Rosholm, Michael

Ereignis: Veröffentlichung

(wer): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

(wo): Bonn

(wann): 2011

Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51900

URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-201107283903

Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

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Objekttyp

Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

Gerdes, Christer
Gränsmark, Patrik
Rosholm, Michael
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

2011

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