On the desirability of an efficiency defense in merger control

Abstract: "We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge are privately informed about merger-specific efficiencies. This enables the firms to influence the merger control procedure by strategically revealing their information to an antitrust authority. Although the information improves upon the quality of the authority's decision, the influence activities may be detrimental to welfare if information processing/ gathering is excessively costly. Whether this is the case depends on the merger control institution and, in particular, whether it involves an efficiency defense. We derive the optimal institution and provide conditions under which an efficiency defense is desirable. We also discuss the implications for antitrust policy and outline a three-step procedure that take the influence activities into consideration." (author's abstract)

Object Details

• Alternative title: Wann ist eine Effizienzverteidigung in der Fusionskontrolle wünschenswert?
• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource, 30 S.
• Language: Englisch
• Notes: Veröffentlichungsversion

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie ; Bd. 02-08

Classification and Topics

• Keyword: Fusionskontrolle ; Synergie ; Effizienz ; Fusion ; Unternehmen ; Informationsverhalten ; Wohlfahrtseffekt ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2002
• Creator: Lagerlöf, Johan ; Heidhues, Paul
• Contributor: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH

Further information

• URN: urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-112537
• Rights: Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 25.03.2025, 1:46 PM CET