Arbeitspapier
How Limiting Deceptive Practices Harms Consumers
There are two competing sellers of an experience good, one offers high quality, one low. The low-quality seller can engage in deceptive advertising, potentially fooling a buyer into thinking the product is better than it is. Although deceptive advertising might seem to harm the buyer, we show that he could be better off when the low-quality seller can engage in deceptive advertising than not. We characterize the optimal deterrence rule that a regulatory agency seeking to punish deceptive practices should adopt. We show that greater protection against deceptive practices does not necessarily improve the buyer-welfare.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 23
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
- Thema
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Misleading Advertising
Deception
Bayesian Consumers
Asymmetric Information
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Piccolo, Salvatore
Tedeschi, Piero
Ursino, Giovanni
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE)
- (wo)
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Milano
- (wann)
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2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Piccolo, Salvatore
- Tedeschi, Piero
- Ursino, Giovanni
- Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE)
Entstanden
- 2015