Arbeitspapier
How Limiting Deceptive Practices Harms Consumers
There are two competing sellers of an experience good, one offers high quality, one low. The low-quality seller can engage in deceptive advertising, potentially fooling a buyer into thinking the product is better than it is. Although deceptive advertising might seem to harm the buyer, we show that he could be better off when the low-quality seller can engage in deceptive advertising than not. We characterize the optimal deterrence rule that a regulatory agency seeking to punish deceptive practices should adopt. We show that greater protection against deceptive practices does not necessarily improve the buyer-welfare.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 23
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
- Subject
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Misleading Advertising
Deception
Bayesian Consumers
Asymmetric Information
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Piccolo, Salvatore
Tedeschi, Piero
Ursino, Giovanni
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE)
- (where)
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Milano
- (when)
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2015
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Piccolo, Salvatore
- Tedeschi, Piero
- Ursino, Giovanni
- Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE)
Time of origin
- 2015