Arbeitspapier

How Limiting Deceptive Practices Harms Consumers

There are two competing sellers of an experience good, one offers high quality, one low. The low-quality seller can engage in deceptive advertising, potentially fooling a buyer into thinking the product is better than it is. Although deceptive advertising might seem to harm the buyer, we show that he could be better off when the low-quality seller can engage in deceptive advertising than not. We characterize the optimal deterrence rule that a regulatory agency seeking to punish deceptive practices should adopt. We show that greater protection against deceptive practices does not necessarily improve the buyer-welfare.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 23

Classification
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Subject
Misleading Advertising
Deception
Bayesian Consumers
Asymmetric Information

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Piccolo, Salvatore
Tedeschi, Piero
Ursino, Giovanni
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2015

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Piccolo, Salvatore
  • Tedeschi, Piero
  • Ursino, Giovanni
  • Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE)

Time of origin

  • 2015

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