Arbeitspapier

How Limiting Deceptive Practices Harms Consumers

There are two competing sellers of an experience good, one offers high quality, one low. The low-quality seller can engage in deceptive advertising, potentially fooling a buyer into thinking the product is better than it is. Although deceptive advertising might seem to harm the buyer, we show that he could be better off when the low-quality seller can engage in deceptive advertising than not. We characterize the optimal deterrence rule that a regulatory agency seeking to punish deceptive practices should adopt. We show that greater protection against deceptive practices does not necessarily improve the buyer-welfare.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 23

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Thema
Misleading Advertising
Deception
Bayesian Consumers
Asymmetric Information

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Piccolo, Salvatore
Tedeschi, Piero
Ursino, Giovanni
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Piccolo, Salvatore
  • Tedeschi, Piero
  • Ursino, Giovanni
  • Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE)

Entstanden

  • 2015

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