Arbeitspapier
Liability for third-party harm when harm-inflicting consumers are present biased
This paper analyzes the workings of liability when harm-inflicting consumers are present biased and both product safety and consumer care influence expected harm. We show that present bias introduces a rationale for shifting some losses onto the manufacturer, in stark contrast with the baseline scenario in which strict consumer liability induces socially optimal product safety and precaution levels. In addition, we establish that strict liability with contributory negligence may induce socially optimal product safety and precaution choices without aggravating the output level distortion.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ILE Working Paper Series ; No. 20
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- Thema
-
Liability
Present Bias
Product Safety
Consumer Precaution
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Friehe, Tim
Rössler, Christoph
Dong, Xiaoge
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE)
- (wo)
-
Hamburg
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Friehe, Tim
- Rössler, Christoph
- Dong, Xiaoge
- University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE)
Entstanden
- 2018
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