Lying, spying, sabotaging: Procedures and consequences

Arbeitspapier

We study individuals who can choose how to compete with an opponent for one nonzero payoff. They can either nudge themselves into a fair set of rules where they have the same information and actions as their opponent, or into unfair rules where they spy, sabotage or fabricate their opponent's action. In an experiment, we observe significant altruism under rules which allow for fabrication and sabotage, but not under rules which allow for spying. We provide direct evidence that this altruism emanates from an ethical concern about the rules of the game. How individuals deal with this concern - whether they nudge themselves into fabrication-free, spying-free, or sabotage-free rules, or whether they assume the power to fabricate or sabotage to compensate their opponent by giving all payoff away - varies along with individuals' attitudes towards power.

Angaben zum Objekt

• ISBN: 978-3-86304-195-3
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 196

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
• Thema: moral judgement ; psychological games ; institutional design ; lying aversion ; sabotage aversion ; spying aversion ; unfair competition

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Chlaß, Nadine ; Riener, Gerhard
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
• (wo): Düsseldorf
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/120864
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ