Lying to appear honest

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies individual truth-telling behavior in the presence of multiple lying opportunities with heterogeneous stake sizes. The results show that individuals lie downwards (i.e. forgo money due to their lie) in low-stakes situations in order to signal honesty, and thereby mitigate the image repercussions of upward lying in high-stakes contexts. This constitutes first evidence of systematic downward lying in an unobserved lying game. The observed behavior is consistent with the spirit, but not the letter, of the prominent models of lying behavior. It therefore presents a challenge for these models.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2019-307

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Tax Evasion and Avoidance ; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
• Subject: private information ; honesty ; truth-telling ; lying ; image ; reputation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Barron, Kai
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2019

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/204826
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET