Arbeitspapier
Lying to appear honest
This paper studies individual truth-telling behavior in the presence of multiple lying opportunities with heterogeneous stake sizes. The results show that individuals lie downwards (i.e. forgo money due to their lie) in low-stakes situations in order to signal honesty, and thereby mitigate the image repercussions of upward lying in high-stakes contexts. This constitutes first evidence of systematic downward lying in an unobserved lying game. The observed behavior is consistent with the spirit, but not the letter, of the prominent models of lying behavior. It therefore presents a challenge for these models.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2019-307
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
- Thema
-
private information
honesty
truth-telling
lying
image
reputation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Barron, Kai
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Barron, Kai
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Entstanden
- 2019