Strategic choice of stock pollution: Why conservatives (appear to) turn green

Arbeitspapier

The public management of stock pollutants is an intertemporal problem; today's optimal choice takes the behavior of future governments into account. If a government expects a successor with different environmental preferences - for instance, if Conservatives expect green successors - it must choose strategically. I model this interaction in a two-period game in which the government of each period chooses consumption as a flow variable that adds to a stock of pollution. In this setting, I analyze how the prospect of losing political power changes the incumbent's policy choice. It is shown that both the prospect of a more conservative or of a greener successor reduce present consumption. This implies that losing power in the future makes a conservative government choose a compromise policy today - which may explain why in some countries, conservative governments seem to adopt green policies. By contrast, the expected loss of power makes a green government choose a policy that appears as a radicalization of their position.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CAWM Discussion Paper ; No. 66

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Environmental Economics: Government Policy ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Noncooperative Games
• Subject: Stock Pollution ; Political Economy of Environmental Policy ; Time Inconsistency ; Strategic choice of stock variables ; Sequential Game ; Partisan Politicians ; Ideological Preferences ; Green Parties

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Voß, Achim
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Centrum für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (CAWM)
• (where): Münster
• (when): 2014

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/95874