Arbeitspapier
The cost of lying
We experimentally investigate the effect of cheap talk in a bargaining game with one-sided asymmetric information. A seller has private information about his or her skill and is provided an opportunity to communicate this information to a buyer through a written message. Four different treatments are compared; one without communication, one with free-form communication, and two treatments with pre-specified communication in the form of promises of varying strength. Our results suggest that lying about private information is costly and that the cost of lying increases with the size of the lie and the strength of the promise. Freely formulated messages lead to the fewest lies and the most efficient outcomes.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance ; No. 666
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
Deception
Communication
Lies
Promises
Experiments
Kommunikation
Betrug
Asymmetrische Information
Sozialökonomik
Test
Schweden
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lundquist, Tobias
Ellingsen, Tore
Gribbe, Erik
Johannesson, Magnus
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
- (wo)
-
Stockholm
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lundquist, Tobias
- Ellingsen, Tore
- Gribbe, Erik
- Johannesson, Magnus
- Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
Entstanden
- 2007
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