Arbeitspapier
The big carrot: High-stakes incentives revisited
Using an international dataset of about 35,000 subjects, this paper provides an empirical example of high-stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. First, we show that incentives (based on absolute belief) play a salient role in religious performance. Second, we find that, when both positive (heaven) and negative (hell) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven are much more relevant than beliefs in hell when estimating the production of religious commodities (church-attendance and praying equations).
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 2009-23
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
- Thema
-
carrot/stick
high-stakes incentives
rewards
punishment
economics of religion
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Brañas-Garza, Pablo
García-Muñoz, Teresa
Neuman, Shoshana
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Ramat-Gan
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Brañas-Garza, Pablo
- García-Muñoz, Teresa
- Neuman, Shoshana
- Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2009