The big carrot: High-stakes incentives revisited

Arbeitspapier

Using an international dataset of about 35,000 subjects, this paper provides an empirical example of high-stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. First, we show that incentives (based on absolute belief) play a salient role in religious performance. Second, we find that, when both positive (heaven) and negative (hell) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven are much more relevant than beliefs in hell when estimating the production of religious commodities (church-attendance and praying equations).

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2009-23

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers ; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
• Subject: carrot/stick ; high-stakes incentives ; rewards ; punishment ; economics of religion

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Brañas-Garza, Pablo ; García-Muñoz, Teresa ; Neuman, Shoshana
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
• (where): Ramat-Gan
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96001
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET