Arbeitspapier
Carrot and Stick? Impact of a Low-Stakes School Accountability Program on Student Achievement
A key concern in the design of education policies relates to the structure of incentives in accountability systems. This paper examines a school accountability program that provides financial support to low-performing schools but has no direct punishment scheme for recipients who do not exhibit improvement. Although the program does not include high-stakes consequences, our estimates indicate that the program reduced the share of underperforming students by 18 percent. This paper's results suggest that to improve student achievement, a school accountability program does not need to set high-stakes consequences that potentially induce unwanted strategic behaviors on the part of school workers.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 9458
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
school accountability
student achievement
school performance
fuzzy regression discontinuity design
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Woo, Seokjin
Lee, Soohyung
Kim, Kyunghee
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Woo, Seokjin
- Lee, Soohyung
- Kim, Kyunghee
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2015
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