Arbeitspapier

Understanding the response to high-stakes incentives in primary education

This paper studies responses to high-stakes incentives arising from early ability tracking. We use three complementary research designs exploiting differences in school track admission rules at the end of primary school in Germany's early ability tracking system. Our results show that the need to perform well to qualify for a better track raises students' math, reading, listening, and orthography skills in grade 4, the final grade before students are sorted into tracks. Evidence from self-reported behavior suggests that these effects are driven by greater study effort but not parental responses. However, we also observe that stronger incentives decrease student well-being and intrinsic motivation to study.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2020-202

Classification
Wirtschaft
Education and Research Institutions: General
Education: Government Policy
Education: Other
Subject
Student Effort
Tracking
Incentives

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bach, Maximilian
Fischer, Mira
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2020

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Bach, Maximilian
  • Fischer, Mira
  • Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

Time of origin

  • 2020

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