Auctions and fair division games under different price rules: Individual bid functions, prices and efficiency rates

Arbeitspapier

In auctions an outside seIler offers a commodity for sale and collects the revenue w hich is achieved. In fair division games the object is owned by the group of bidders. Consequently the auction's revenue is equally distributed among all bidders. In our experiment participants face four auction types (first versus second price - auction versus fair division game) repeteadly. Due to the strategy method (one bids before learning one's private value) we can investigate the slope and curvature of individual bid functions) the evidence for risk aversion, the comparative statics with respect to the game type, the price expectations and the efficiency rates.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 1999,101

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Auctions ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
• Subject: auctions ; fair division games ; bid function

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Güth, Werner ; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta ; Königstein, Manfred ; Strobel, Martin
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 1999

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/61722
• URN: urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10046888
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET