Arbeitspapier

Is tax harmonization useful?

It is a widely acknowledged result of the literature on capital tax competition that underprovision of public goods can only be avoided if tax coordination between governments is intensive and residence-based capital taxation can be enforced. In this paper we use a model where commodity and factor taxes are available and we show that governments competing for tax bases will choose a globally efficient tax structure. In contrast to previous conclusions, we also show that the availability of a destination-based commodity tax or a labor tax is necessary to mitigate the problem of inefficient Nash equilibria and thus reduces the necessity of supranational tax harmonization or coordination.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CoFE Discussion Paper ; No. 00/23

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Steuerwettbewerb
Steuerharmonisierung
Doppelbesteuerung
Zwei-Länder-Modell
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Theorie
Bestimmungslandprinzip

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Eggert, Wolfgang
Genser, Bernd
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Konstanz, Center of Finance and Econometrics (CoFE)
(where)
Konstanz
(when)
2000

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-5284
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Eggert, Wolfgang
  • Genser, Bernd
  • University of Konstanz, Center of Finance and Econometrics (CoFE)

Time of origin

  • 2000

Other Objects (12)