Arbeitspapier
Transfer Pricing and Partial Tax Harmonization
This paper investigates regulation on corporate income taxation with multinationals and transfer pricing. We recommend full cooperation within the EU if profit shifting costs are sufficiently low and cannot be influenced to a large extend. Otherwise, high profit shifting costs or the potential to significantly influence them imply that partial cooperation is beneficial for all member states.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6875
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
International Investment; Long-term Capital Movements
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- Subject
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tax harmonization
transfer pricing
multinational
profit shifting
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Eggert, Wolfgang
Goerdt, Gideon
Heitzmann, Sebastian Felix
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2018
- Handle
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Eggert, Wolfgang
- Goerdt, Gideon
- Heitzmann, Sebastian Felix
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2018
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