Arbeitspapier
Transfer Pricing and Partial Tax Harmonization
This paper investigates regulation on corporate income taxation with multinationals and transfer pricing. We recommend full cooperation within the EU if profit shifting costs are sufficiently low and cannot be influenced to a large extend. Otherwise, high profit shifting costs or the potential to significantly influence them imply that partial cooperation is beneficial for all member states.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6875
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
International Investment; Long-term Capital Movements
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- Thema
-
tax harmonization
transfer pricing
multinational
profit shifting
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Eggert, Wolfgang
Goerdt, Gideon
Heitzmann, Sebastian Felix
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Eggert, Wolfgang
- Goerdt, Gideon
- Heitzmann, Sebastian Felix
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2018
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