Do tax information exchange agreements curb transfer pricing-induced tax avoidance?

Arbeitspapier

We propose a game theoretical model where a multinational company with divisions in two countries and the respective tax authorities interact with each other. Prior to an audit the functional profile of the divisions is unknown to the tax authorities. In equilibrium, tax avoidance emerges in both countries. It turns out that the audit pressure is highest for firms with a hybrid functional profile, dampening their production and reducing their after-tax profit. We find that introducing a bilateral Tax Information Exchange Agreement reduces tax avoidance by aggressive transfer pricing in the high-tax ("domestic") country and precludes tax avoidance in the lowtax ("foreign") country. The volume of production increases. The foreign tax authority discontinues its audit activities, while the domestic tax authority audits less often at least if the foreign division is a toll manufacturer ("routine function"). While the expected net tax revenues increase in the foreign country, they may decrease in the domestic country.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Passauer Diskussionspapiere - Betriebswirtschaftliche Reihe ; No. B-29-17

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Management ; Tax Evasion and Avoidance ; Multinational Firms; International Business ; Tax Law
• Thema: transfer pricing ; tax evasion ; cooperation

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Diller, Markus ; Lorenz, Johannes
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Universität Passau, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
• (wo): Passau
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/179478
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ