Arbeitspapier
Is tax harmonization useful?
It is a widely acknowledged result of the literature on capital tax competition that underprovision of public goods can only be avoided if tax coordination between governments is intensive and residence-based capital taxation can be enforced. In this paper we use a model where commodity and factor taxes are available and we show that governments competing for tax bases will choose a globally efficient tax structure. In contrast to previous conclusions, we also show that the availability of a destination-based commodity tax or a labor tax is necessary to mitigate the problem of inefficient Nash equilibria and thus reduces the necessity of supranational tax harmonization or coordination.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CoFE Discussion Paper ; No. 00/23
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Steuerwettbewerb
Steuerharmonisierung
Doppelbesteuerung
Zwei-Länder-Modell
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Theorie
Bestimmungslandprinzip
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Eggert, Wolfgang
Genser, Bernd
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Konstanz, Center of Finance and Econometrics (CoFE)
- (wo)
-
Konstanz
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-5284
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Eggert, Wolfgang
- Genser, Bernd
- University of Konstanz, Center of Finance and Econometrics (CoFE)
Entstanden
- 2000