Arbeitspapier
Classical Corporation Tax as a Global Means of Tax Harmonization
Classical corporation tax entails double taxation of corporate income. The alternative practice to impute corporation tax to the domestic recipients of dividends is shown, in the case of a company with international owners, effectively to convert the imputation system back to a classical corporation tax. It also requires complex rules for exempting flow-through dividends from equalization tax to avoid the cumulation of corporation tax internationally. In contrast, classical corporation tax maintains its simplicity and can be designed so as to be neutral in respect of the financing and dividend decisions of multinationals, by adopting double taxation of interest income. Broad tax bases, flat-rate taxes on personal income from capital, and low statutory tax rates are advocated as general policy.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 665
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kari, Seppo
Ylä-Liedenpoha, Jouko
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2002
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kari, Seppo
- Ylä-Liedenpoha, Jouko
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2002
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