Two kinds of voting procedures manipulability: Strategic voting and strategic nomination

Arbeitspapier

In this paper the concepts of manipulation as strategic voting (misrepresentation of true preferences) and strategic nomination (by adding, or removing alternatives) are investigated. The connection between Arrow's and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems is discussed from the viewpoint of dilemma between dictatorship and manipulability.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IES Working Paper ; No. 11/2015

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
• Thema: arrow's theorem ; dictatorship ; Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem ; manipulation ; Pareto efficiency ; strategic voting ; strategic nomination

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Turnovec, František
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Charles University in Prague, Institute of Economic Studies (IES)
• (wo): Prague
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/120441
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ