Arbeitspapier
Cheap Talk with Correlated Signals
We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering information from one or more informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation on the incentives to report information truthfully is non monotone, and correlation may discipline senders equilibrium behavior, making it easier to sustain truth-telling.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 24
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Thema
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Cheap Talk
Multiple Senders
Correlation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Chand, A.K.S.
Currarini, Sergio
Ursino, Giovanni
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Chand, A.K.S.
- Currarini, Sergio
- Ursino, Giovanni
- Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE)
Entstanden
- 2015
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