Public servants in parliament: Theory and evidence on its determinants in Germany

Bericht

This paper addresses the personal linkages between the public service and the legislature that emerge because public servants pursue a political mandate. There are concerns that the strong representation of public servants in many Western parliaments compromises the constitutionally proposed political neutrality of the public service and generates a conflict of interest. We present a cost-benefit calculus and analyze specific legal provisions for the German Laender to understand the selection of public servants into parliaments. Based on a novel data set, we find that incompatibility rules decrease and abeyance compensation increases the fraction of public servants in Laender parliaments.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: WWZ Forschungsbericht ; No. 08/09

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government ; Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
• Thema: Political selection ; Parliamentary election ; Public servants ; Incompatibility ; Wahl ; Gewaltenteilung ; Staatliche Einflussnahme ; Bürokratie ; Teilstaat ; Deutschland

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Stutzer, Alois ; Braendle, Thomas
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Universität Basel, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Zentrum (WWZ)
• (wo): Basel
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127530
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ