Bureaucrats in Parliament: Theory and Evidence on its Determinants in Germany

Arbeitspapier

This paper addresses the personal linkages between the public administration and the legislature that emerge because public servants pursue a political mandate. There are concerns that the strong representation of bureaucrats in many Western parliaments compromises the constitutionally proposed political neutrality of the public service and generates a con ict of interest. We present a cost-bene t calculus and analyze speci c legal provisions for the German Laender to understand the selection of public servants into parliaments. Based on a novel data set, we nd that incompatibility rules decrease and abeyance compensation increases the fraction of public servants in Laender parliaments.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WWZ Working Paper ; No. 07/08

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government ; Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
• Subject: Political selection ; parliamentary election ; public servants ; incompatibility ; Wahl ; Gewaltenteilung ; Staatliche Einflussnahme ; Bürokratie ; Teilstaat ; Deutschland

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Braendle, Thomas ; Stutzer, Alois
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)
• (where): Basel
• (when): 2008

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5451/unibas-ep16288
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/123389
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET