Selection of Public Servants into Politics

Arbeitspapier

Countries differ substantially in how they deal with politicians that come from the public sector. Most constitutions include incompatibility and ineligibility rules due to concerns about conflicts of interest and the politicization of the public service. We study how these rules affect the attractiveness of parliamentary mandates for public servants and thus the selection into politics. We compile a novel dataset that captures the fraction of public servants in 76 national legislatures as well as the respective (in)compatibility regimes. On average, there are seven percentage points fewer public servants in parliaments where a strict regime is in force. Supplementary evidence based on IV estimations shows that the fraction of public servants in parliament is positively correlated with government consumption, but not correlated with government effectiveness.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CREMA Working Paper ; No. 2015-18

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Other Substantive Areas of Law: Other
• Subject: political selection ; public servants ; incompatibility ; political representation ; compensation of politicians ; government consumption

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Braendle, Thomas ; Stutzer, Alois
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
• (where): Zürich
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/214583
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET