Arbeitspapier
The market for extortions
We consider extortion gangs that are mafia-like in their protection of targets, but that are unlike the Mafia in their competition over targets. Does this type of organized crime pay? How are the returns to extortion affected by the number of competing extortionists and the violence they apply? Does the supply of extortions create the demand for protection that the groups live from? In order to answer such questions we analyse a model that focus on the trade-off between congestion and demand creation in the market for extortions. – violence ; extortion ; economics of organized crime
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: WIDER Discussion Paper ; No. 2001/26
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Law and Economics: General
- Thema
-
Organisierte Kriminalität
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Mehlum, Halvor
Moene, Karl Ove
Torvik, Ragnar
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
- (wo)
-
Helsinki
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
29.04.2025, 12:11 MESZ
Datenpartner
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Mehlum, Halvor
- Moene, Karl Ove
- Torvik, Ragnar
- The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
Entstanden
- 2001
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