Arbeitspapier

The Market for Paid Sick Leave

In many countries, general practitioners (GPs) are assigned the task of controlling the validity of their own patients' insurance claims. At the same time, they operate in a market where patients are customers free to choose their GP. Are these roles compatible? Can we trust that the gatekeeping decisions are untainted by private economic interests? Based on administrative registers from Norway with records on sick pay certification and GP-patient relationships, we present evidence to the contrary: GPs are more lenient gatekeepers the more competitive is the physician market, and a reputation for lenient gatekeeping increases the demand for their services.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 9825

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Social Security and Public Pensions
Analysis of Health Care Markets
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Thema
absenteeism
gatekeeping
competition
role-conflicts

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Markussen, Simen
Røed, Knut
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Markussen, Simen
  • Røed, Knut
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2016

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