Organizing competition for the market

Arbeitspapier

The paper studies competition for the market in a setting where incumbents (and, to a lesser extent, neighboring incumbents) benefit from a cost advantage. The paper first compares the outcome of staggered and synchronous tenders, before drawing the implications for market design. We find that the timing of tenders should depend on the likelihood of monopolization. When monopolization is expected, synchronous tendering is preferable, as it strengthens the pressure that entrants exercise on the monopolist. When instead other firms remain active, staggered tendering is preferable, as it maximizes the competitive pressure that comes from the other firms.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper Series ; No. 03

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Auctions ; Market Design ; Publicly Provided Goods: General ; National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement ; Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation ; Economics of Regulation ; Transportation Economics: Government Pricing and Policy
• Subject: Dynamic procurement ; incumbency advantage ; localmonopoly ; competition ; asymmetric auctions ; synchronous contracts ; staggered contracts

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Iossa, Elisabetta ; Rey, Patrick ; Waterson, Michael
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Bocconi University, Centre for Research on Geography, Resources, Environment, Energy and Networks (GREEN)
• (where): Milan
• (when): 2019

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/235115
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET