The market for extortions

Arbeitspapier

We consider extortion gangs that are mafia-like in their protection of targets, but that are unlike the Mafia in their competition over targets. Does this type of organized crime pay? How are the returns to extortion affected by the number of competing extortionists and the violence they apply? Does the supply of extortions create the demand for protection that the groups live from? In order to answer such questions we analyse a model that focus on the trade-off between congestion and demand creation in the market for extortions. – violence ; extortion ; economics of organized crime

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WIDER Discussion Paper ; No. 2001/26

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions ; Law and Economics: General
• Subject: Organisierte Kriminalität ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Mehlum, Halvor ; Moene, Karl Ove ; Torvik, Ragnar
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
• (where): Helsinki
• (when): 2001

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53079
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET