Arbeitspapier
Chinese networks and tariff evasion
In this paper we combine the tariff evasion analysis of Fisman and Wei (2004) with Rauch and Trindade's (2002) study of Chinese trade networks. Chinese networks are known to act as trade catalysts by enforcing contracts and providing market information. As tariff evasion occurs outside the law, market information is scant and formal institutions inexistent, rendering networks the more important. We find robust evidence that Chinese networks, proxied by ethnic Chinese migrant populations, increase tariff evasion, i.e. the tariff semi-elasticity of Chinese missing imports. We suggest the effects takes place through matching of illicit-minded traders, identification of corrupt customs agents and enforcement of informal contracts.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Working Paper ; No. 20/2010
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Thema
-
tariff evasion
China
illicit trade
migrant networks
Zoll
Schmuggel
China
Korruption
Unternehmensnetzwerk
Soziale Beziehungen
Welt
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Rotunno, Lorenzo
Vézina, Pierre-Louis
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
- (wo)
-
Geneva
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Rotunno, Lorenzo
- Vézina, Pierre-Louis
- Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
Entstanden
- 2010
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