How Delegation Improves Commitment

Arbeitspapier

We often use delegation as a commitment device if a government faces problems of timeinconsistency. McCallum (1995, AER P&P) challenged this practice, claiming that delegation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it. In a model where delegation and specific policies are subject to the same commitment technology it is shown that McCallum’s conjecture holds if optimal ex-ante policies are fixed. However, with a flexibility-credibility trade-off delegation is both desirable and improves credibility. While delegation does not increase commitment per se it makes it more attractive and increases investments in credibility. Delegation can therefore serve as a valid commitment device.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Paper Series ; No. 466

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
• Thema: Time-inconsistency ; commitment ; delegation ; Zeitkonsistenz ; Glaubwürdigkeit ; Neue politische Ökonomie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Perino, Grischa
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
• (wo): Heidelberg
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127277
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ