Arbeitspapier

How Delegation Improves Commitment

We often use delegation as a commitment device if a government faces problems of timeinconsistency. McCallum (1995, AER P&P) challenged this practice, claiming that delegation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it. In a model where delegation and specific policies are subject to the same commitment technology it is shown that McCallum’s conjecture holds if optimal ex-ante policies are fixed. However, with a flexibility-credibility trade-off delegation is both desirable and improves credibility. While delegation does not increase commitment per se it makes it more attractive and increases investments in credibility. Delegation can therefore serve as a valid commitment device.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Paper Series ; No. 466

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Thema
Time-inconsistency
commitment
delegation
Zeitkonsistenz
Glaubwürdigkeit
Neue politische Ökonomie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Perino, Grischa
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
(wo)
Heidelberg
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Perino, Grischa
  • University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2008

Ähnliche Objekte (12)