Arbeitspapier
How Delegation Improves Commitment
We often use delegation as a commitment device if a government faces problems of timeinconsistency. McCallum (1995, AER P&P) challenged this practice, claiming that delegation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it. In a model where delegation and specific policies are subject to the same commitment technology it is shown that McCallum’s conjecture holds if optimal ex-ante policies are fixed. However, with a flexibility-credibility trade-off delegation is both desirable and improves credibility. While delegation does not increase commitment per se it makes it more attractive and increases investments in credibility. Delegation can therefore serve as a valid commitment device.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Discussion Paper Series ; No. 466
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
- Thema
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Time-inconsistency
commitment
delegation
Zeitkonsistenz
Glaubwürdigkeit
Neue politische Ökonomie
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Perino, Grischa
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Heidelberg
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Perino, Grischa
- University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2008