Climate Policy Commitment Devices

Arbeitspapier

We develop a dynamic resource extraction game that mimics the global multi-generation planning problem for climate change and fossil fuel extraction. We implement the game under different conditions in the laboratory. Compared to a ‘libertarian’ baseline condition, we find that policy interventions that provide a costly commitment device or reduce climate threshold uncertainty reduce resource extraction. We also study two conditions to assess the underlying social preferences and the viability of ecological dictatorship. Our results suggest that climate-change policies that focus on investments that lock the economy into carbon-free energy sources provide an important commitment device in the intertemporal cooperation problem.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 049.2017

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Externalities ; Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy ; Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
• Subject: Climate Policy Instruments ; Intertemporal Cooperation ; Climate Game ; Experiments

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Dengler, Sebastian ; Gerlagh, Reyer ; Trautmann, Stefan T. ; van de Kuilen, Gijs
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/177243
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET