Arbeitspapier

Equal Sharing Rules in Partnerships

Partnerships are the prevalent organizational form in many industries. Most partnerships share profits equally among the partners. Following Kandel and Lazear (1992) it is often argued that ``peer pressure'' mitigates the arising free-rider problem. This line of reasoning takes the equal sharing rule as exogenously given. The purpose of our paper is to show that with inequity averse partners - a behavioral assumption akin to peer pressure - the equal sharing rule arises endogenously as an optimal solution to the incentive problem in a partnership.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2007-29

Classification
Wirtschaft
Production and Organizations: General
Economics of Contract: Theory
Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms; Employee Ownership
Subject
equal sharing rule
partnerships
incentives
peer pressure
inequity aversion
Unternehmenskooperation
Gewinnverwendung
Gerechtigkeit
Vertragstheorie
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bartling, Björn
Siemens, Ferdinand von
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
(where)
München
(when)
2007

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.2027
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-2027-1
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Bartling, Björn
  • Siemens, Ferdinand von
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät

Time of origin

  • 2007

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