Arbeitspapier

The impact of consumer loss aversion on pricing

We develop a model in which a profit-maximizing monopolist with uncertain cost of production sells to loss-averse, yet rational, consumers. We first introduce (portable) techniques for analyzing the demand of such consumers, and then investigate the monopolist's pricing strategy. Compared to lower possible purchase prices, paying a higher price in the firm's pricing distribution is assessed by consumers as a loss, decreasing demand for the firm's product. We provide conditions under which a firm with continuously distributed marginal cost responds by (locally) eliminating this comparison effect and choosing a discrete price distribution; that is, prices are sticky. Price stickiness is more likely to obtain when the cost distribution has high density, the price responsiveness of demand is low, or consumers are likely to purchase. Whether or not prices are sticky, the monopolist wants to at least mitigate the comparison effect, leading to countercyclical markups. On the other hand, if consumers expect to buy the product, they experience a loss if they end up not consuming it, increasing their willingness to pay for it. Thus, despite the tendency toward price stability, there are also circumstances in which a firm with unchanging cost offers random sales to increase customers' expectation to consume, attracting more demand at higher prices.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2004-17

Classification
Wirtschaft
Consumer Economics: Theory
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change; Industrial Price Indices
Food; Beverages; Cosmetics; Tobacco; Wine and Spirits
Other Consumer Nondurables: Clothing, Textiles, Shoes, and Leather Goods; Household Goods; Sports Equipment
Subject
Reference-dependent utility
price stickiness
monopoly pricing
kinked demand curve
countercyclical markups
sales
promotions
(seemingly) predatory pricing

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Heidhues, Paul
Köszegi, Botond
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2004

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Heidhues, Paul
  • Köszegi, Botond
  • Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

Time of origin

  • 2004

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