Arbeitspapier
Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game
We contrast and compare three ways of predicting efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. The three alternatives are based on ordinal potential, quantal response and impulse balance theory. We report an experiment designed to test the respective predictions and find that impulse balance gives the best predictions. A simple expression detailing when enforced contributions result in high or low efficiency is provided.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: School of Economics Discussion Papers ; No. 1506
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Public Goods
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- Thema
-
public good
threshold
impulse balance theory
quantal response
forced contribution
ordinal potential
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Cartwright, Edward
Stepanova, Anna
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Kent, School of Economics
- (wo)
-
Canterbury
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Cartwright, Edward
- Stepanova, Anna
- University of Kent, School of Economics
Entstanden
- 2015
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game
Experimental investigations of binary threshold public good games
Individual Differences and Contribution Sequences in Threshold Public Goods
Coordination under threshold uncertainty in a public goods game
Coordination under threshold uncertainty in a public goods game
Voting and Equilibrium Selection in Threshold Public Goods Games
Meet Me at the Threshold - Asymmetric Preferences in a Threshold Public Goods Game
Voting and transfer payments in a threshold public goods game
Success rates in simplified threshold public goods games: A theoretical model
Gender and culture in a threshold public goods game: Japan versus Canada
Voting on contributions to a threshold public goods game: An experimental investigation
Asymmetric Public-Good Games - Experiments on Contribution Norms Encouraging Cooperation
Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game
Experimental investigations of binary threshold public good games
Individual Differences and Contribution Sequences in Threshold Public Goods
Coordination under threshold uncertainty in a public goods game
Coordination under threshold uncertainty in a public goods game
Voting and Equilibrium Selection in Threshold Public Goods Games
Meet Me at the Threshold - Asymmetric Preferences in a Threshold Public Goods Game
Voting and transfer payments in a threshold public goods game
Success rates in simplified threshold public goods games: A theoretical model
Gender and culture in a threshold public goods game: Japan versus Canada
Voting on contributions to a threshold public goods game: An experimental investigation
Asymmetric Public-Good Games - Experiments on Contribution Norms Encouraging Cooperation
Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game
Experimental investigations of binary threshold public good games
Individual Differences and Contribution Sequences in Threshold Public Goods
Coordination under threshold uncertainty in a public goods game
Coordination under threshold uncertainty in a public goods game
Voting and Equilibrium Selection in Threshold Public Goods Games
Meet Me at the Threshold - Asymmetric Preferences in a Threshold Public Goods Game
Voting and transfer payments in a threshold public goods game
Success rates in simplified threshold public goods games: A theoretical model
Gender and culture in a threshold public goods game: Japan versus Canada
Voting on contributions to a threshold public goods game: An experimental investigation