A theory of transactions privacy

Arbeitspapier

In this paper, we consider the costs and benefits of transactions privacy. In the environment we consider, privacy is the concealment of potentially useful information, but concealment also potentially bestows benefits. In some versions of the environment, the standard Coasian logic applies: given an unambiguous initial assignment of rights and sufficient flexibility in contracting, efficiency in information revelation will result. Coasian bargaining may be impeded, however, by either an inability to make certain commitments or by the presence of significant investments that must be made before the transaction occurs. In such cases, initial assignments of rights (for example, privacy laws) can have consequences for efficiency

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2000-22

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: Internet ; Electronic commerce ; Consumer protection ; Privacy

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kahn, Charles M. ; McAndrews, James ; Roberds, William
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
• (where): Atlanta, GA
• (when): 2000

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/100812
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET