Arbeitspapier
Privacy in implementation
In most implementation frameworks, agents care only about the outcome and not at all about the way in which it was obtained. Additionally, typical mechanisms for full implementation involve the complete revelation of all private information to the planner. In this paper I consider the problem of full implementation with agents who may prefer to protect their privacy. I analyze the extent to which privacy-protecting mechanisms can be constructed under various assumptions about agents' predilection for privacy and the permissible game forms.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1561
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
Nash implementation
subgame perfect implementation
privacy
Nash implementation
subgame perfect implementation
privacy
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gradwohl, Ronen
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gradwohl, Ronen
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 2013