Arbeitspapier
Achieving cooperation under privacy concerns
Two players choose whether to cooperate on a project. Each of them is endowed with some evidence, and if both possess a sufficient amount then cooperation is profitable. In order to facilitate cooperation the players reveal evidence to one another. However, some players are concerned about privacy, and so revelation of evidence that does not result in cooperation is costly. We show that in equilibrium evidence can be exchanged both incrementally and all at once, and identify conditions under which the different rates of evidence exchange are optimal.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1572
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
- Thema
-
Cooperation
Privacy
Communication
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dziuda, Wioletta
Gradwohl, Ronen
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dziuda, Wioletta
- Gradwohl, Ronen
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 2013