Arbeitspapier

Achieving cooperation under privacy concerns

Two players choose whether to cooperate on a project. Each of them is endowed with some evidence, and if both possess a sufficient amount then cooperation is profitable. In order to facilitate cooperation the players reveal evidence to one another. However, some players are concerned about privacy, and so revelation of evidence that does not result in cooperation is costly. We show that in equilibrium evidence can be exchanged both incrementally and all at once, and identify conditions under which the different rates of evidence exchange are optimal.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1572

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Thema
Cooperation
Privacy
Communication

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dziuda, Wioletta
Gradwohl, Ronen
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
(wo)
Evanston, IL
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dziuda, Wioletta
  • Gradwohl, Ronen
  • Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Entstanden

  • 2013

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