Arbeitspapier

Sub-National Optimal Budget Allocation and Borrowing under Soft Budget Constraint

Local governments have borrowed largely from the banking system to finance their deficits instead of responding to the rigors of bond markets. This paper analizes how sub-national governments optimally reallocate the provision of public goods and decide on borrowing, in a model where the banking system faces a soft budget constraint. In contrast with recent literature, sub-national governments allocate a higher (lower) than optimal amount of resources to consumption public goods (infrastructure investment) and overborrow if they expect the banking system to be bailed out. Controls on sub-national borrowing like the golden rule seem to be inefficient to avoid excesive indebtedness at state level.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 24/2006

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Fiscal federalism
soft budget constraints
local public investment
sub-national borrowing

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Crivelli, Ernesto
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Crivelli, Ernesto
  • University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Entstanden

  • 2006

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