Arbeitspapier

Financing Infrastructure under Budget Constraint

In this paper we consider the problem of financing infrastructure when the regulator faces a budget constraint. The optimal budget-constrained mechanism satisfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more efficient firms produce the same quantity. The second property is self-selection for the less efficient firms. The third property is that the mechanism is a third best one. In other words, as long as the budget-constraint is binding, the optimal output is strictly lower than the second best output for any given type. Finally, if the budget constraint is too strong, then we have a full bunching solution.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 15/2002

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Publicly Provided Private Goods
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Regulation
Thema
Regulation
Asymmetric Information
Budget Constraint
Infrastrukturinvestition
Haushaltskonsolidierung
Asymmetrische Information
Budgetrestriktion
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gautier, Axel
Mitra, Manipushpak
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gautier, Axel
  • Mitra, Manipushpak
  • University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Entstanden

  • 2002

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