Arbeitspapier
Financing Infrastructure under Budget Constraint
In this paper we consider the problem of financing infrastructure when the regulator faces a budget constraint. The optimal budget-constrained mechanism satisfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more efficient firms produce the same quantity. The second property is self-selection for the less efficient firms. The third property is that the mechanism is a third best one. In other words, as long as the budget-constraint is binding, the optimal output is strictly lower than the second best output for any given type. Finally, if the budget constraint is too strong, then we have a full bunching solution.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 15/2002
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Publicly Provided Private Goods
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Regulation
- Thema
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Regulation
Asymmetric Information
Budget Constraint
Infrastrukturinvestition
Haushaltskonsolidierung
Asymmetrische Information
Budgetrestriktion
Theorie
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gautier, Axel
Mitra, Manipushpak
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
- (wo)
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Bonn
- (wann)
-
2002
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gautier, Axel
- Mitra, Manipushpak
- University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
Entstanden
- 2002