Arbeitspapier

A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint

We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and money does not enter the procurer's objective function.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 310

Classification
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Auctions
Rationing; Licensing
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Subject
Auctions
Mechanism Design
Knapsack Problem
Dominant Strategy
Budget
Procurement
Auktionstheorie
Mechanismus-Design-Theorie
Auktionstheorie
Beschaffung
Budgetrestriktion
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ensthaler, Ludwig
Giebe, Thomas
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(where)
München
(when)
2010

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13244
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13244-4
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ensthaler, Ludwig
  • Giebe, Thomas
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Time of origin

  • 2010

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