Arbeitspapier

Privatizations in developing countries and the government's budget constraint

In this paper, we study the impact of government's budget constraint on the optimal industrial policy in industries with increasing returns to scale. We show that privatization is preferred to regulation for intermediate values of the shadow cost of public funds (i.e., the Lagrange multiplier of the government's budget constraint). However, the advantage of privatization is likely to disappear once the product market allows the entry of more than one firm.In this paper, we study the impact of government's budget constraint on the optimal industrial policy in industries with increasing returns to scale. We show that privatization is preferred to regulation for intermediate values of the shadow cost of public funds (i.e., the Lagrange multiplier of the government's budget constraint). However, the advantage of privatization is likely to disappear once the product market allows the entry of more than one firm.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 75.2002

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Privatisierung
Deregulierung
Budgetrestriktion
Industriepolitik
Theorie
Entwicklungsländer

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Auriol, Emmanuelle
Picard, Pierre M.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2002

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Auriol, Emmanuelle
  • Picard, Pierre M.
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 2002

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